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Land Contracts in Ohio-The Need for Reform
With increasing frequency, the financing arrangement for the con-
veyance of real estate is being accomplished by the use of the land con-
tract.' The nature of the relationship between the land contract vendor
and vendee, their respective rights upon the contract's breach, and the
striking similarity between the land contract and the real estate mortgage
have caused the courts of Ohio great concern.
Courts have persistently treated the vendee who has defaulted on the
land contract severely, notwithstanding their willingness to grant relief
to the defaulting mortgagor in a similar position. The anticipated per-
petuation of this unwarranted distinction by the courts forms the founda-
tion for urging that the Ohio legislature assume the task, as others have
done, of improving the status of the land contract vendee upon his de-
fault. In general, no attempt has been made in this paper to analyze the
judicial treatment of land contracts in other jurisdictions. Suffice it to
say that the variations among the holdings, to a great extent, defy com-
parative analysis.
Initially, a distinction must be drawn between the two common types
of executory contracts for the sale of real estate. In the majority of real
estate transactions, which rely upon conventional mortgage financing,
the preliminary sales contract is used. Its purpose is to implement an
immediate transfer of the vendor's legal title in the realty upon perform-
ance of its conditions. In contrast, we are exclusively concerned with the
long-term installment land contract. It is a conveyancing device through
which the vendee takes immediate possession of the property. The ven-
dor retains legal title to the property to secure the payment of the pur-
chase price which he receives through deferred installment payments over
an extended number of years.2
THE VARIETY OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
THAT UTILIZE THE LAND CONTRACT INSTRUMENT
An appreciation of the wide range of real estate transactions which
utilize the land contract conveyancing instrument is necessary, as back-
ground, for an objective study of the problem.
1. See NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMM., RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRAcrs 343-85 (1937).
2. See generally Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in Cu.rr TRENDs IN STATE LEGIS-
LATION 1953-1954, at 417 (1954); NORTH, VAN BuREN & SMrI, REAL. ESTATE FiNANc-
ING 191 (1928).
Land Contracts in Ohio
Farm properties are commonly purchased and sold under a land con-
tract arrangement' Furthermore, to an increasing extent, it is used by
builders of large scale, low-cost housing developments.4 However, the
practice which has cast the land contract into a state of justifiable disre-
pute and has created the urgent need for remedial legislation is one of
recent development. Specifically, it is a procedure by which the land con-
tract agreement has been converted into an instrument being used for
unbridled overreaching by a large group of unscrupulous speculators.
Their victims live within the large, heavily populated, metropolitan areas
in which there is taking place a transition from one racial group, usually
Caucasian, to another, commonly the Negro.'
Briefly, it is the interplay between the very limited financial resources
of the potential homeowners being attracted to the neighborhood, the
arbitrary refusal of lending institutions to provide mortgage loans for the
particular area, and the present owners' anxiety to sell their homes that
allows speculators to purchase reasonably sound residential properties at
prices far below their true values. Furthermore, it is a combination of
an acute shortage of housing plus the use of minimal down payments as
bait that creates a strong demand for the properties. This allows the
speculators to sell them on "land contract" for an amount greatly in ex-
cess of their cost. The vendor buttresses his dominant economic position
in the transaction and attempts to guarantee its profitability by inserting
various key phrases into the land contract agreement.
As frequently happens, the financial burden of making large monthly
installment payments which the vendee has assumed becomes too heavy,
thereby causing him to default upon his contractual obligation.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the land contract is also used
to accomplish the sale of real estate in a manner which is beneficial to
both the seller and the purchaser. On occasion, the owner of residential
real estate, after deciding to sell, finds that he must personally assume
a share of the financing burden if he is to realize his property's actual
value. Situations inviting this decision commonly arise where the
amount of the down payment becomes a competitive factor in the pre-
vailing real estate market. Under these circumstances the owner can of
course reduce the sale price. However, the more attractive alternative
is to finance the purchase himself for the difference between the sale
price and the amount of the available down payment (plus the amount
of the existing mortgage indebtedness). When the vendor chooses to
3. FEDBRAL REsERVE BANK OF CLEvELAND, BusINEss TRENDS, Farm Purchases by In-
stall ments, Nov. 12, 1961.
4. Note, Real Estate: Installment Land Contract: Termination of Vendee's Rights After
Default, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 264 (1956).
5. See Satter, Land Contract Sales in Chicago: Security Turned Exploitation, 39 Cr1. BAR
REc. 262 (1958).
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provide a portion of the credit financing, the parties may use the pur-
chase money mortgage or the land contract.' The mortgagee-vendor
however stands in a more perilous position, compared to that of a land
contract vendor, upon a default by the purchaser.
Both the purchase money mortgage and the land contract accomplish
a basically identical result, that is, they reserve in the vendor a security
interest in the property to the extent of the vendee's debt.7
While these two transactions take different forms, they are used to ac-
complish an identical purpose. In both cases the vendor seeks to
retain an interest in the property he has sold as security for the pay-
ment of the unpaid balance of the price. It is with the realization that
the vendor's interest under an installment [contract] is merely by way of
security, that one must approach the subject.8
However, the underlying feature which makes the land contract the more
attractive method is that upon the vendee's default the vendor can nor-
mally recover possession of the property and retain all past installment
payments as liquidated damages, through summary proceedings.
PROVISIONS OF THE STANDARD LAND CONTRACT
By inserting certain "magic phrases" into the land contract instru-
ment, the vendor secures for himself a commanding advantage over the
vendee when the latter defaults upon the land contract. The following
provisions attain this dominant position for the vendor and therefore
appear in the standard long-term installment land contract.'
(1) Time is of the essence of the contract.?0
6. I GLENN, MORTGAGES § 15 (1943); Levin, Maryland Rule on Forfeiture Under Land
Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9 MD. L. REV. 99 (1948).
7. In the purchase money mortgage transaction the grantor transfers a deed to the grantee,
and to secure the amount of the debt owed to the grantor the grantee simultaneously executes
a mortgage to the grantor. The effect is that the grantor retains the legal or equitable title
to the property (depending upon whether he is in a "tide state" or a "lien state") as security
for the payment of the purchase price. In the land contract transaction, the grantor retains
the legal title to the property as security for the purchase money. Both instruments are there-
fore security devices in which the purchaser is a debtor while the vendor is a creditor with a
security interest in the property. 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 343 (1943). Howe, Forfeitures in
Land Contracts, in CuRRENT TRENDs IN STATE LEGIsLATION 1953-1954, at 417 (1954).
8. NEW YORK LAw REVISIoN COMM., LEG. Doc. No. 65(M), 13 (1937), in Levin,
Maryland Rule on Forfeiture Under Land Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9
MD. L. REv. 100 (1948).
9. In the interest of uniformity, all subsequent discussion of the land contract will assume
that these provisions are contained therein, unless otherwise stated.
10. Time can be made the essence of a contract by the express stipulation of the parties.
Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853); Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
Notwithstanding the absence of an express time of the essence clause in a real estate contract,
one will be implied under proper circumstances. For example, a court implied time to be of
the essence after the vendor served the vendee with notice upon the latter's breach of the con-
tract. Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853); Note, Equitable Relief Against Forfeiture
in Land Sales, 32 YALE L.J. 65 (1922). Contra, O'Brien v. Bradulov, 80 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1948). See also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 791 (3d ed. 1961).
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(2) Upon the default of the vendee, the vendor reserves the right to
declare the contract forfeited, to recover possession of the land, and to
retain all past installment payments made on the purchase price and all
improvements placed upon the land as liquidated damages.
(3) Upon the vendee's default, the vendor can elect to accelerate all
future payments due on the land contract. He shall also have the right
to compel continued performance of the contract by the vendee.
(4) Failure by either of the parties to enforce a right granted to them
by the contract shall not be treated as a waiver of that right or as
creating an estoppel or modification of the contract; but the same shall
be considered as a gratuitous forebearance.
(5) After default and notice to vacate the vendee shall henceforth be
deemed a mere tenant-at-will under the vendor.
The time of the essence provision allows the vendor's reserved powers
to be utilized at the vendee's default. When it is coupled with the for-
feiture clause and the acceleration clause the vendor is assured, at least in
theory, of a controlling position at the default.11 Courts, as a general
rule, apply the above default provision of the land contract and determine
the rights of the vendor and vendee accordingly."2
By the great weight of American authority no relief can be afforded
against express conditions precedent inflicting forfeiture where the
contract makes time of the essence, although the delay may be very slight
and although the buyer has paid a large part of the price and has greatly
improved the land. The vendor is entitled to the land, with all improve-
ments, fixtures and growing crops, and in addition to the purchase
money already paid.1a
Notwithstanding this statement, it is dear that contemporary courts dis-
play a more enlightened attitude in this respect and refuse to enforce the
express terms of the land contract where the equities of the case so de-
11. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 791 (3d ed. 1961); Levin, Maryland Rule on Forfeiture
Under Land Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9 MD. L. REV. 99 (1948).
12. See Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in CURRENT Tamu~s IN STATE LEGISLATION
1953-1954, at 449 (1954). The declaration of a forfeiture does not result in inequitable
treatment to the vendee in every case. See Miller v. Blockberger, 111 Ohio St. 798, 807, 146
N.E. 206 (1924). Whenever the part performance rendered by the vendee exceeds the
amount of the loss suffered by the vendor because of the vendee's default, a forfeiture is an
inequitable method of relief. The problem therefore centers itself around those cases where
the part performance by the vendee is more valuable to the vendor than the amount of the
injury caused by the vendee's breach. See 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1057 (1951); Corbin,
The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE LJ. 1013
(1931).
13. Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REV. 329, 345 (1921). See
generally 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1075, 1129 (1951); McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 153
(1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 791 (3d ed. 1961). Note, Do New Jersey Courts
"Abhor" Forfeitures in Contracts for the Sale of Land?, 7 RUTGERS L. REV. 396 (1953). A
minority of jurisdictions gives the vendee relief by refusing to enforce the terms of the land
contract literally. Note, Equitable Relief Against Forfeiture in Land Sales, 32 YALE LJ. 65
(1922). The oppressive majority view in recent years is losing ground as a result of either
legislative action or the courts' exercise of discretion as to whether or not to declare a forfeiture.
See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 1473 (rev. ed. 1937).
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mand.'4 The equitable results are achieved by declaring the damages
clause to be in effect a penalty or a forfeiture provision, thereby denying
the vendor the relief sought by him. This attitude, which has generally
been adopted by the Ohio courts, 5 is justified when attention is directed
toward two additional factors. First, the similarity between the status of
the land contract vendee and the mortgagor suggests that the vendee
in default be afforded relief similar to that provided the mortgagor
in default. Second, the vendee while in possession of the realty or,
in the absence of possession, during the executory stages of the land con-
tract, has a vested equitable interest in the property which must be fully
recognized. Fundamentally, it is this vested equitable interest that sup-
plies the vendee in default with the power to defend against the enforce-
ment of a forfeiture. An understanding of the true nature of this equit-
able interest is paramount to a strengthening of the judicial or statutory
relief which should be made available to the vendee in default.
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
The property interests of the land contract vendor and the vendee
are substantially determined through application of the doctrine of equit-
able conversion."8 The entire approach to the treatment of the parties'
land contract interests is based upon the maxim, "Equity treats as done
that which in good conscience ought to be done."'" In applying this doc-
trine the courts of Ohio uniformly recognize that the execution of a con-
tract for the sale of realty works a conversion and conveys to the vendee
in possession an equitable estate in the land.'" The vendee's interest is a
14. See generally 5 CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 1055 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs
1473 (rev. ed. 1937).
15. It is unequivocally clear that the judiciary has developed the machinery through which
it can erase a forfeiture provision. However, to pronounce that "in Ohio it seems fairly
settled that such forfeiture clauses ... will not be enforced," 20 OHIO JUR. 2d Equity 5 35
(1956), seems to be an unwarranted overstatement of the present status of the Ohio law. For
as a matter of clear fact forfeiture clauses, under proper circumstances, are sustained. -[I]n
cases otherwise cognizable in equity forfeitures will be enforced when that is more consonant
with the principles of right, justice and morality than to withhold relief." Woloveck v.
Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922). See, e.g., Norpac Realty Co. v. Schackner, 107 Ohio St.
425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923); Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853); Miami Inv. Corp. v.
Baker, 109 Ohio App. 334, 165 N.E.2d 690 (1959); Clukey v. Doro Realty Co., 5 Ohio L.
Abs. 260 (Ct. App. 1926).
16. Raymond v. Butts, 84 Ohio St. 51, 95 N.E. 387 (1911). The doctrine of equitable
conversion was recognized in Ohio by dictum in an early case, Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St 276
(1876).
17. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 377 (5th ed. 1941). Oberholtz v. Oberholtz,
79 Ohio App. 540, 74 N.E.2d 574 (1947); 1955 OPs. ATr'y GEN. (Ohio) 150.
18. Coggshall v. Marine Bank Co., 63 Ohio St. 88, 57 N.E. 1086 (1900); Oberholtz v.
Oberholtz, 79 Ohio App. 540, 74 N.E.2d 574 (1947); Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App.
210 (1922); 1955 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) 150. See Butcher v. Kagey Lumber Co., 164
Ohio St. 85, 128 N.E.2d 54 (1955).
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vested one,19 and he is recognized as being the beneficial owner of the
property to the extent of the purchase price paid.2" Upon full payment
of this obligation his interest ripens into a complete equity, entitling him
to a conveyance of the legal title to the property.2 From the date of the
contract's execution, the vendor retains the legal title to the property as
security for the performance of the vendee's obligation to pay the pur-
chase price.' In addition to the legal title he also holds a beneficial es-
tate in the lands to the extent of the unpaid purchase price. 3
Furthermore, by the application of the effects of the doctrine of equit-
able conversion, and other equitable doctrines, the majority of American
courts hold that the vendee's equitable ownership casts upon him the
risk of accidental injury or destruction to the property. 4
Once it is accepted that the vendee has an equitable interest in the
realty during the executory stages of the land contract, a closer examina-
tion of the fundamental problem, that is, the vendee's default upon the
land contract, is in order.
DEFAULT UPON THE LAND CONTRACT - RELIEF
GRANTED TO THE PARTIES
Forfeiture
Distinguishing Between a Liquidated Damages Clause and a
Penalty Clause
Theoretically the enforcement of a forfeiture provision in one case
and the refusal to do so in another case is justified by characterizing the
damages provision as one for liquidated damages in the former case and
19. An estate is vested in interest when there is a present fixed right of future enjoyment.
The estate is contingent when the right of enjoyment is to accrue on an event which is un-
certain. First Natel Bank v. Logue, 89 Ohio St. 288, 106 N.E. 21 (1914).
20. See cases cited note 18 supra. Morgan v. Stevenson, 39 Ohio App. 335, 177 N.E.2d
247 (1931).
21. Coggshall v. Marine Bank Co., 63 Ohio St. 88, 57 N.E. 1086 (1900); Woloveck v.
Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922); 1955 Ops. An"ly Gr3N. (Ohio) 150. See Butcher v.
Kagey Lumber Co., 164 Ohio St. 85, 128 N.E.2d 54 (1955).
22. Butcher v. Kagey Lumber Co., 164 Ohio St. 85, 128 N.E.2d 54 (1955); Oberholtz v.
Oberholtz, 79 Ohio App. 540, 547, 74 NXE.2d 574, 579 (1947); Williams v. Johns, 34 Ohio
App. 230, 170 N.E. 580 (1930); 1955 Ops. A'r1Y GEN. (Ohio) 150. See First Nat'l Bank
v. Logue, 89 Ohio St. 288, 106 N.E. 21 (1914); 4 PomRoY, EQutTy JuIJSPRUD)NCE 5
1260 (5th ed. 1941). When the title to the property is retained by the vendor as security for
the purchase price, the vendor has an interest commonly called a lien.
23. Coggshall v. Marine Bank Co., 63 Ohio St. 88, 57 N.E. 1086 (1900); Jaeger v. Hardy,
48 Ohio St. 335, 27 N.E. 863 (1891); Williams v. Johns, 34 Ohio App. 230, 170 N.E. 580
(1930).
24. Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 444 (1953). But see Trapp v. Steubenville Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.
6 Ohio Supp. 211 (36 NE.2d) (1941). The court decided that the vendor of real estate
under a land contract was liable for damages to a party who was injured as a result of a viola-
tion of Ohio General Code section 1006 (now Ohio Revised Code section 4107.14), com-
monly referred to as "the handrail statute." The court held that the vendor was "owner"
1962]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
as a penalty in the latter case." The reason for distinguishing between
liquidated damages and penalties arises out of the universal rule that
equity "abhors a forfeiture" and that it will not lend aid to its enforce-
ment,2" especially one which arises out of the non-payment of money."
It is true, as a recent Ohio appellate court has said, that "the prin-
ciples of law governing the interpretation of contracts which provide for
the payment of liquidated damages for breach of the contract are estab-
lished by clear pronouncements in decisions by the Supreme Court of
the state."28 However, as a practical matter, it is submitted that the legal
tests and factual circumstances examined by the courts to distinguish be-
tween a liquidated damage clause and a penalty in general contractual
settings are not to be given significant consideration when the identical
issue arises in a land contract transaction.
The primary factor that compels this conclusion is that the damages
clause in the land contract does not reflect a true liquidation calculation
or honest estimate of the actual damages sustained by the vendor upon
a default. This result is occasioned by the fact that the amount of "liqui-
dated damages" retained by the vendor upon a default varies in inverse
proportion to the loss actually sustained by him. Stated differently, there
is no direct relationship between the vendee's continuously increasing
equity in the property and any additional damage caused by the vendee's
default.29
Other practical considerations militate against the application of
identical tests in land contracts and normal contractual transactions. For
of the realty and notwithstanding the fact that the vendee was in possession, the vendor was
nevertheless liable. For other views on this point, see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
11.31 (1952); Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion: I, 44 YALE
I.J. 559 (1935).
25. See Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
26. Jones v. Stevens, 112 Ohio St. 43, 146 N.E. 894 (1925); Webster v. Dwelling House
Ins. Co., 53 Ohio St. 558, 42 N.E. 546 (1895); Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210
(1922); 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1731 (14th ed. 1918).
27. Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
28. Economy Sav. & Loan Co. v. Holington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (1957).
The rules controlling the construction of liquidated damages clauses are generally set forth
in Jones v. Stevens, 112 Ohio St. 43, 146 N.E. 894 (1925). The supreme court stated:
"'Where the parties have agreed to the amount of damages, ascertained by estimation and ad-
justment, and have expressed this agreement in clear and unambiguous terms, the amount so
fixed should be treated as liquidated damages and not as a penalty, if the damages would be
(1) uncertain as to amount and difficult of proof and if (2) the contract as a whole is not
manifestly so unconscionable, unreasonable, and disproportionate in amount as to justify the
conclusion that it does not express the true intention of the parties, and if (3) the contract is
consistent with the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that damages in the
amount stated should follow the breach thereof." See generally CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§
1057-58, 1063-64 (1951); 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1731 (14th ed. 1918); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 783 (3d ed. 1961); Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damages
Clause - When and How, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 221 (1959).
29. See Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION
1953-1954, at 417 (1954).
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example, the assumption relied upon in the general area of contract law
to enforce a liquidated damages clause is that the parties were sui juris
and dealing on an equal footing during their negotiations. However, in
the usual land contract sale it is dear that the vendor holds a dominant
economic position and stands in complete control of the terms and con-
ditions of the sale. Moreover, the pre-estimate of damages which the
liquidated damages clause is supposed to constitute does not in fact exist
at the execution of the land contract. It is doubtful whether the parties
during their negotiations manifest any intention concerning the amount
that should constitute the correct measure of damages upon a breach of
the contract. It is dear that the use of the term "liquidated damages" in
a land contract appears purely as a matter of form. It is merely a label
borrowed from other contractual transactions and it does not effectively
fit the needs of the specialized land contract transaction.
The Qualification Test
The courts are aware of the realities surrounding the usual land con-
tract transaction and generally de-emphasize the principles applied in gen-
eral contract law (to distinguish between liquidated damages and penal-
ties) and place controlling emphasis upon the "qualification test," as an-
nounced by the Ohio Supreme Court in Norpac Realty Company v.
Schackne.o
Where it is impossible for a vendor and vendee, contracting for the sale
of property, to fix with any degree of certainty what damages may accrue
to the seller under the contract, they may agree upon a stipulated amount
as liquidated damages. The foregoing principle is subject to the follow-
ing qualification: if the amount so agreed upon is extravagantly un-
reasonable or manifestly disproportionate to the actual damages sus-
tained, a court of equity will not enforce the provision for liquidated
damages, but will regard it as a penalty. (Emphasis added.)
This test measures the relationship of the vendor's actual damages caused
by the vendee's default against the value of the vendee's partial perform-
ance. In effect it permits the judiciary to adopt a test which can accurate-
ly distinguish between liquidated damages and a penalty in the special-
ized land contract setting. This test places controlling emphasis upon the
circumstances of the transaction as of the time of the default. In com-
parison, in a normal contractual setting (where a court is called upon to
decide the issue of the liquidated damages versus penalty), the emphasis
is placed upon the circumstances as they existed at the execution date of
the contract. The "qualification test" has found judicial expression in a
variety of forms and therefore has supplied the courts with wide latitude
in distinguishing between liquidated damages and a penalty.
30. 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 NE. 480 (1923). See Economy Sav. & Loan Co. v. Hollington,
105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (1957).
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To summarize, throughout most of the land contract cases on the
issue of liquidated damages versus a penalty runs the principle that jus-
tice requires that the vendor recover only fair compensation for his in-
jury, rather than that a punishment should be imposed upon the vendee
for his default.3 Therefore as a practical matter success or failure in
passing the "qualification test" is conditioned upon the court's decision
that the amount to be retained by the vendor is or is not unreasonable
in relation to the actual damages sustained by him as a result of the yen-
dee's default.3 Where the court concludes that there is a reasonable re-
lationship between the two, the amount paid in on the contract is labeled
as liquidated damages and the agreement is enforced.3 On the other
hand, if the court concludes that the balance between the vendee's equity
in the property and the vendor's injuries weigh in the vendee's favor, they
characterize the liquidated damages provision as a penalty and grant the
vendee relief.34 The "qualification test" then assumes the form of an
implied condition,: appearing in every land contract, through which
equity can, at the time of the vendee's default, measure the reasonable-
ness between the damages sustained by the vendor as compared to the
value of the vendee's partial performance.
In addition to the application of the foregoing "qualification test"
equity has seized upon a variety of other mechanisms to grant relief, un-
der appropriate circumstances, against a forfeiture.
The Doctrine of Waiver
Courts commonly make use of the doctrine of waiver as the instru-
ment by which they avoid the harshness of a forfeiture.3 " The underly-
ing thesis of the doctrine is that the vendor's acquiescence to the vendee's
failure to comply with the exact terms of the contract, for example, his
acceptance of irregular installments on the purchase price, constitutes a
31. Miller v. Blockberger, 111 Ohio St. 798, 146 N.E. 206 (1924); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1057 (1951). See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1473 (rev. ed. 1937).
32. Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause - When and How, 20 OHIO ST. L.J.
221 (1960).
33. Ibid. See also Clukey v. Doro Realty Co., 5 Ohio L. Abs. 260 (Ct. App. 1926); 5 CoR-
BIN, CONTRACTS § 1058, 1964 (1951).
34. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1058, 1064 (1951). The vendee, being a contract breaker,
is not entitled to a complete recovery of amounts paid by him. Instead he should be charged
with the cost of the damages sustained by the vendor. In cases where the vendee has only a
nominal equity in the property the courts properly decide that a forfeiture is the correct
measure of relief. Under such circumstances, the amount of the payment made represents a
fair reflection of the values of the respective parties' rights.
35. See Rummington v. Kelley, 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 97, 103 (1836); Hegg v. Sigle, 14 Ohio L.
Abs. 456 (Ct. App. 1933); Curtis v. Factory Site Co., 12 Ohio App. 148 (1919); Cleland v.
Cleland, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 152 N.E.2d 914 (C.P. 1958); Pound, The Progress of the Law,
.1918-1919 - Equity, 33 HARV. L. REv. 929 (1920). "Strict doctrines as to forfeiture in-
evitably produce loose doctrines as to 'waiver.'" 33 HARv. L. REV. at 952.
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waiver of his right subsequently to enforce a forfeiture! 6  This proposi-
tion has been stated as follows:
[T]he receipt of a part or the whole of the purchase money, after the
time of payment had elapsed, might be construed into a waiver on the
part of a vendor, of any advantage he might have taken in consequence
of the default of the vendee. And the same would be the case should
the vendor by any other conduct manifest that he did not intend to insist
upon a strict and literal performance by the other party 3 7
It is virtually impossible to set forth, with any degree of accuracy, the
factual circumstances under which a vendee in default can safely rely
upon this doctrine.8  The ease with which the waiver doctrine can be
applied to avoid the effectiveness of a forfeiture provision has led many
draftsmen to attempt to counteract its operation by inserting appropriate
language in the land contract.
Judicial Determination of a Forfeiture
In further attempting to ease the oppressive force of a forfeiture, the
courts do not permit a forfeiture ipso facto to arise upon the vendee's fail-
ure to make an installment payment, notwithstanding the presence of a
time of the essence clause and an express contractual provision allowing
the vendor to treat the contract as forfeited. The vendor must serve the
vendee in default with notice of his intention either to rescind the con-
tract or to accelerate the due date of all future payments, and give the
vendee a reasonable time to remedy the default."9 This requisite notice
is adequately manifested by the filing of a bill to rescind or a petition in
forcible entry and detainer.40
36. 20 Omo Jut. 2d Equity SS 36, 38 (1956).
37. Curtis v. Factory Site Co., 12 Ohio App. 148, 158 (1919), quoting Rummington v.
Kelley, 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 97 (1836).
38. In Economy Savings & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125
(1957), the trial court held that the vendor had waived his right to a forfeiture-at the vendees
default. This conclusion was reached because the vendor had accepted installment payments
at irregular times and had made no demand that the purchaser make payments in accordance
with the contract terms. The appellate court, without any additional disclosure of the facts, re-
versed the lower court. It said: "We do not consider that the doctrine of waiver has any
application in determination of the cause now before the court.
"It is not reasonable to infer that, by receiving some irregular payments and not demanding
a termination of the contract because the purchaser failed to make the payments regularly, as
provided in the contract, the vendor intended or should be expected to waive the right to
terminate the contract when the purchaser has become insolvent and is now unable to make
any further payments according to the terms of the contract." 105 Ohio App. at 253, 162
N.E.2d at 132.
39. See Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853). After notice the vendee in default must
tender payment within a reasonable time or be barred by the rescission. State ex rel. Morgan
v. Stevenson, 39 Ohio App. 335, 177 N.E. 247 (1931); Geil v. Lehr, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 638
(C.P. 1906).
40. Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853); Sternberg v. Washington, 177 NE.2d 525
(Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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It has also been held that in order to render the contract void certain
questions of fact must first be judicially determined.4' For example, the
written communication to the vendee that the land contract is now "for-
feited and is a dead letter," does not constitute a perfected rescission or
forfeiture. 2 This perfected forfeiture or rescission will not arise until a
court of competent jurisdiction has decreed it or until the vendor has
actually recovered possession.43 In addition to the requirement of notice
the vendor must be able to convey a marketable tide, in accordance with
the terms of the contract, at the time of the default; otherwise, he will not
be permitted to declare a forfeiture.44
Additional Remedies Available to the Vendor
Upon the Vendee's Default
A variety of remedies, in addition to a forfeiture decree, are available
to the vendor upon the vendee's default. However, a study of the case
law discloses that both the courts and legal counsel are perplexed over
the purposes and relief which these actions serve to accomplish. To some
extent, it is felt that the confusion is partially attributable to a loose inter-
change of legal terminology. The result is that the unfortunate confu-
sion and conflict existing in the case law defy critical analysis. Never-
theless an attempt has been made to crystallize those principles which
emerge from the decisions.
The terms of the standard land contract permit the vendor, upon the
vendee's default, to bring an action to have the contract cancelled, recover
possession of the property, and retain the payments on the purchase price
as liquidated damages. In the alternative he can elect to sue on the con-
tract for the balance of the purchase price due.45
In disaffirming the contract the vendor can bring an action to quiet
his title and have the contract rescinded.4" Technically speaking how-
ever, rescission involves not only the termination of the contract, but also
the restoration of the contracting parties substantially to the status quo
as of the time the contract was executed." Rescission therefore can be
41. State ex rel. Morgan v. Stevenson, 39 Ohio App. 335, 177 N.E. 247 (1931).
42. Curtis v. Factory Site Co., 12 Ohio App. 148 (1919). See also Geil v. Lehr, 4 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 638 (C.P. 1906).
43. ibid.
44. See Woloveck v. Scheuler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
45. Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E.2d 1 (1938). There is some
authority that the vendor need not pursue either of the two remedies stipulated in the contract.
Rather, unless he is bound by the contract to resort only to those remedies stipulated, he can
resort to any other remedial device. Kegerreis v. Citizens Trust Co., 52 Ohio App. 412, 3
N.E.2d 896 (1936).
46. Norpac Realty Co. v. Shackne, 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923); Economy Say.
& Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (1957). See D. W. Kauf-
man Realty Co. v. Unknown Heirs of Lucas, 23 Ohio App. 470, 155 N.E. 173 (1925).
47. Annot., 94 A.L.RL 1239 (1935).
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safely relied upon by the vendor only where the value of the installments
paid are reasonably proportionate to the rental value and/or profits pro-
duced by the property during the vendee's occupancy. Only under such
circumstances can the vendor have the land contract rescinded and still
retain these amounts as damages.48
An action in ejectment will also serve to recover possession of realty
being held by the vendee after his default and after the vendor has de-
dared a forfeiture pursuant to the terms of the land contract.49
However, a summary statutory procedure more frequently adopted
to recover possession after the default is an action in forcible entry and
detainer." Recent case law has held that the forcible entry and detainer
action is, under Ohio law, a possessory action only.51 That is, it is de-
signed to serve the sole function of determining the right of the plaintiff
to the immediate possession of the property, and it does not test the ven-
dor's title in the property." By statute, municipal courts have jurisdiction
over the action," unless the question of title is introduced into the pro-
ceedings.54 The municipal court's decision in a forcible entry and de-
tainer action does not serve as a bar to a subsequent suit in common pleas
court on the question of the parties' respective equitable interests in the
property.
55
The alternative election which the vendor can make is to stand on
the contract and sue the vendee for the balance due on the purchase
48. Higby v. Whittaker, 8 Ohio 198 (1837). See Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Hollington,
105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E2d 125 (1957); Buydden v. Mitchell, 102 N1E.2d 21 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1951).
49. Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922); Contractors & Builders Supply Co. v.
Cresap, 9 Ohio App. 73 (1917).
50. See Sternberg v. Washington, 177 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); State ex rel.
Everson v. Municipal Court of Barberton, 98 Ohio App. 177, 128 N.E.2d 467 (1954).
Swiers v. Smith, 150 N.E.2d 517 (Oberlin Ohio Munic. Ct. 1958); Huddleston v. Ward,
68 N.E.2d 580 (Dayton Ohio Munic. Ct. 1946); Kennelly v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 173, 183
N.E. 41 (1932).
51. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Hamilton County Court, 173 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
See Sternberg v. Washington, 177 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). Contra, State ex rel.
Morgan v. Stevenson, 39 Ohio App. 335, 337, 177 N.E. 247, 248 (1931). In an action for
forcible entry and detainer "the title to real estate is clearly involved, as the equitable interests
which arise by reason of the land contract would have to be judicially determined." Cf. Hud-
dleston v. Ward, 68 N.E.2d 580 (Dayton Ohio Munic. Ct. 1946).
52. Jenkins v. Hamilton County Court, 173 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
53. OHIo REv. CODE § 1901.18.
54. Sternberg v. Washington, 177 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Olds v. Morse, 98
Ohio App. 382, 129 N.E.2d 644 (1954). Common pleas courts have no original jurisdiction
over these proceedings. 24 OHIo JuR. 2d Porcibkl Entry and Detainer § 28 (1957).
55. Ohio Revised Code section 1923.03 states: "Judgments under sections 1923.01 to
1923.14 inclusive, of the Revised Code, either in the county court or in the court of common
pleas, are not a bar to a later action brought by either party." This statute is an exception
to the general rule relative to res judicata, and leaves open for further consideration disputes
between the parties growing out of the identical subject matter. Jenkins v. Hamilton County
Court, 173 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Heck v. Hlavin, 61 Ohio App. 270, 103
N.E.2d 282 (1951); Swiers v. Smith, 150 N.E.2d 517 (Oberlin Ohio Munic. Ct. 1958).
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price.56 In affirming the contract upon a default, the vendor can also
adopt the usual breach of contract remedy and institute suit for the in-
termediate installments that are past due.57
Furthermore, essentially identical results can be achieved by institut-
ing an action to compel specific performance of the contract or an action
to compel a foreclosure and judicial sale of the property.58
An additional question worthy of mention is whether the vendor can
recover the reasonable rental value of the premises from the vendee for
his possession after the date of default. Success or failure in this attempt
apparently hinges upon whether the land contract contains a provision
whereby the vendee becomes a mere tenant at will upon his default."
On the basis of these decisions the standard land contract now includes
this provision to further strengthen the vendor's position. Furthermore,
it has been held that the joinder statute, Ohio Revised Code section
2309.05 (g), authorizes the joinder of an action to cancel the contract
with one to recover for the rental value of the premises.6"
Relief Available to the Vendee Upon His Own Default
In appropriate circumstances, various relief measures are available to
the vendee in default, notwithstanding the fact that he has breached the
contract. The problem is, "What equity or combination of equities must
the vendee show to overcome this initial advantage in the vendor and ob-
tain the relief he is seeking?"'"
56. Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
The vendee's obligation to pay the purchase price and the vendor's obligation to convey
a deed upon its payment are "mutually dependent" covenants. Where the covenants are de-
pendent, as they are in most contracts for the sale of realty, neither party can maintain an
action on the contract without proving performance, or a tender of performance on his part.
Will-O-Way Dev. Co. v. Mills, 122 Ohio St. 242, 171 N.E. 94 (1930); Raudabaugh v. Hart,
61 Ohio St. 73, 55 N.E. 214 (1899).
57. Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
58. Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION
1953-1954, at 432 (1954). See Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E.2d
1 (1938); Sanford v. Breidenbach, 111 Ohio App. 474, 173 N.E.2d 702 (1960); Woloveck
v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
The difference in the two remedies lies in their emphasis rather than in their results. An
action in specific performance recognizes the payment of the purchase price whereas a fore-
closure action recognizes the vendor's lien on the realty in the nature of an equitable mortgage
through which he can enforce his interests. Theoretically, both actions would ultimately re-
sult in a judicial sale of the property and a personal judgment against the vendee for the
deficiency.
59. Everson v. Municipal Court of Barberton, 98 Ohio App. 177, 128 N.E.2d 467 (1954).
See Sternberg v. Washington, 177 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). But see Geil v. Lehr,
4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 638 (C.P. 1906), which held that a vendee after default and notice to
vacate, in the absence of a contractual provision, did not become a tenant at will and therefore
liable to the vendor for the reasonable rental value of the property from date of notice.
60. Sternberg v. Washington, 177 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
61. Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION
1953-1954, at 443 (1954). See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 421 (1950).
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Specific Performance Decree After Default
Regardless of the trend in other jurisdictions " and disregarding the
holdings of past Ohio decisions,63 it is apparent that a contemporary Ohio
court, on one basis or another, will disregard the force of the forfeiture
language in the land contract if the vendee tenders payment of the bal-
ance due on the purchase price within a reasonable time after default."
Though no Ohio court has offered a specific explanation for its actions,
the reason for this enlightened approach seems dear. It appears to be the
court's recognition of this underlying principle: The retention of title
by the vendor with its incident right of forfeiture is, in substance, held
only as security for the performance of the vendee's pecuniary obligation.
Therefore, upon the tender of payment in satisfaction of the vendee's con-
tract debt, there no longer is any need for the vendor to retain title to
the property inasmuch as the purpose for which the security interest was
created has been fulfilled. It is evident that the granting of a decree of
specific performance to the vendee after his default is equivalent to a
mortgagor's bill to redeem from the mortgagee after law day.65
As previously discussed, courts often justify their action in granting
the vendee a decree for specific performance after his default, by resorting
to the doctrine of waiver or estoppel to circumvent the forfeiture lan-
guage of the contract.66
62. Historically the general rule has been that when the parties have so stipulated as to make
the time of payment of the essence of the contract, within the view of equity as well as of law,
the court of equity cannot relieve the vendee who has made default. See generally authorities
cited Note 13 supra. See also 2 PO,mROy, EQuriy JUESPRUDENCB §§ 448-60 (5th ed. 1941).
63. E.g., Campbell v. Hicks, 19 Ohio St. 433 (1869). The court refused to decree specific
performance for the vendee in a case in which he tendered payment twenty-eight days after the
last installment was due. The basis of the refusal was that the court found that there had not
been a waiver by the vendor.
64. Dependabilt Homes, Inc. v. White, 117 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Morris v.
George C. Benning, Inc., 77 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947); Kundtz v. Van Deboe Haeger
& Co., 24 Ohio C.C.R- (n.s.) 139 (Cir. Ct. 1902), aff'd, 70 Ohio St. 485, 72 N.E. 1166
(1904); Curtis v. Factory Site Co., 12 Ohio App. 148 (1919); Cleland v. Cleland, 152
N.E.2d 914 (C.P. 1958).
The liberal attitude presently being displayed by the courts should not however be over-
stated or misconstrued. To illustrate, a contemporary court would still be correct in holding,
as did a prior one, in Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853), that a tender of payment by
the vendee three years after default and after there has been a substantial increase in the value
of the land does not deserve a display of equitable sympathy, and its refusal to grant a decree
for specific performance would be proper.
Irrespective of the vendee's right to specific performance, it will not be granted if after
the land contract has been executed, title to the property has been conveyed to a bona fide
purchaser for value. When such circumstances arise, the vendee's remedy lies in an action
for damages against the vendor. See Hegg v. Sigle, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 456 (Ct. App. 1933);
Tyler v. Martin, 11 Ohio L Abs. 660 (Ct. App. 1932).
65. DmtJEE, CASES ON SEcuRrry 169-70 (1951).
66. Kundtz v. Van Deboe Haeger & Co., 24 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 139 (Cir. Ct. 1904), affld,
70 Ohio St. 485, 72 N.E. 1166 (1904). See Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853).
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Recovery of Consideration Paid Which Exceeds the
Vendor's Damages
The foregoing discussion presupposes that the vendee can raise the
balance due on the purchase price within a reasonable time after his de-
fault. Needless to say, as a practical matter, this is often an unwarranted
supposition. A party who cannot make a single installment payment will
normally be unable to raise the total balance due on the purchase price.
This predicament suggests the question: Can the vendee recover from
the vendor that amount paid by him which exceeds the damages sustained
by the vendor due to the vendee's default? There is a growing trend in
some jurisdictions which permits the vendee to recover such excessive
amounts in an action for restitution.6" The vendee can introduce his
claim for restitution by suing in assumpsit, counterclaiming in an action by
the vendor, or by seeking restitution as an alternative to specific perform-
ance."8 Unfortunately the great weight of authority in the United States
denies restitution to the defaulting vendee.6" However, it has been sug-
gested that the initial strength of this conclusion can be diluted by the
realization that in a great many of the cases denying restitution, the ven-
dee was unable to establish a sufficient disparity between his partial per-
formance and the vendor's damages for equity to take cognizance of his
plea for restitution."0 But the fact remains that many courts denying
relief do so solely because they feel compelled to enforce the express for-
feiture provisions of the contract."'
In a fairly recent Ohio appellate case72 a vendee in default success-
fully resorted to an action for money had and received. He was granted
a recovery of the amount by which his installment payments on the pur-
chase price exceeded the fair rental value of the property during his oc-
cupancy7 The decision, however, is subject to theoretical criticism and
67. Recent Decision, Real Property - Land Contracts - Strict Foreclosure and Unjust En-
richment, WIS. L. REV. 324 (1961). See also Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d
489 (1953); Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments
Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931).
68. Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION
1953-1954, at 446 (1954).
69. CORBIN, CoNTaAcrs §§ 1129-30 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 791 (3d ed.
1961).
70. See Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid,
40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931).
71. See Howe, op. cit. supra note 68, at 447.
72. Brown v. Johnston, 95 Ohio App. 136, 108 N.E.2d 298 (1952).
73. The court reasoned that the land contract had in effect been rescinded and its elimination
remanded the vendee to such relief as he would be entitled to if a contract did not exist.
Extending this reasoning, it found that the plaintiff-vendee was not suing on his contract, but
that "in such a case the law raised an obligation which may be enforced in an action for
money had and received." Id. at 139, 108 N.E.2d at 299.
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its efficacy is questionable.74 But inasmuch as the Ohio courts have dis-
played a more flexible attitude towards a disregard of the forfeiture pro-
visions, it is felt that a vendee in default, under proper circumstances,
would have a reasonable possibility of successfully recovering by pro-
ceeding on the restitution theory.
Remedies Available to the Vendee Upon the Vendor's Default
Situations do, of course, arise in which the vendee stands ready, will-
ing, and able to perform the agreement but the vendor defaults on one
or more of his obligations under the contract. When the transaction as-
sumes this posture, the vendee can invoke his normal contractual reme-
dies.75 He may sue for breach of contract, for specific performance, or
seek to have the contract rescinded.7" The authorities are not in agree-
ment as to the measure of damages recoverable by the vendee in an action
for breach of contract.7 It has been recently held in Ohio that the vendee
can recover the difference between the amount due on the contract at the
date of the vendor's breach and the market value of the property as of
that date.7"
Restitutionary relief should be made available to the vendee as a
method through which he can recover damages.7 9 There are funda-
mental distinctions between this mode of recovery and an action for
breach of contract.
Where the purchaser has paid any part of the purchase money, and the
seller does not complete his engagement, so that the contract is totally
74. It has been stated that an action for money had and received would not lie where the
purchaser had been in possession of the property prior to the rescission. The reason given
for this position was that once the vendee had been in possession the parties could no longer
be placed in statu quo. I SuGDEN, VENDORS 359 (8th Am. ed. 1873). See Sprouse v.
Buchanan, 105 Ohio App. 43, 151 N.E.2d 42 (1956).
See also the cases cited in Brown v. Johnston, 95 Ohio App. 136, 108 N.E.2d 298
(1952), upholding the vendor's refusal to refund the past installments paid by the vendee
after the vendee's default.
Furthermore, the one case cited by the Brown case as authority for its reasoning is Swee v.
Bregenzer, 19 Ohio C.C.RL (n.s.) 563 (Cir. Ct. 1912). This case did not involve a land
contract transaction but rather, it was a conventional real estate conveyance in which the ven-
dee treat&8 the contract for the sale as having been rescinded, and elected to sue in an action
for money had and received.
Additional doubt is cast upon the propriety of the decision by the fact that no subsequent
cases have been found which have adopted or even mentioned this decision. See also Middle-
port Woolen Mills Co. v. Titus, 35 Ohio St. 253 (1879).
75. See Sprouse v. Buchanan, 105 Ohio App. 43, 151 N.E.2d 42 (1956); Howe, Forfeitures
in Land Contracts, in CuRRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1953-1954, at 442 (1954).
76. See Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853).
77. Sprouse v. Buchanan, 105 Ohio App. 43, 151 N.E.2d 42 (1956), and authorities cited.
78. Ibid.
79. See cases cited in Sprouse v. Buchanan, 105 Ohio App. 43, 151 N.E.2d 42 (1956);
Gordon v. Guarantee Tite & Trust Co., 28 Ohio L Abs. 249 (Ct. App. 1938); Swee v.
Bregenzer, 19 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 563 (Cir. Ct. 1912).
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unexecuted, the purchaser may affirm the agreement by bringing an
action for the non-performance of it, or he may disaffirm it, and bring
an action for money had and received to his use.80 (Emphasis added.)
THE NEED FOR REFORM:
LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL
If the land contract is ever to achieve a trusted position through
which interests in real estate can be conveyed through the use of low
equity financing, the rights and obligations of both the vendor and vendee
must be more firmly defined. To gain respectability and reliability
equal to the mortgage instrument, the parties must be able to anticipate
with a reasonable degree of certainty their exact rights and duties during
the preliminary negotiations, the executory stages, and upon default. At
present, the defaulting vendee's position is impossible to predict. A
corollary to this is that while existing uncertainty as to rights and reme-
dies upon default has been caused, in part, by the vendor's exploitation
of his dominant position, the vendor's status has been undermined to
the extent that the actual effectiveness of his secured position at default
is difficult to evaluate.8 "The multitude of facts and circumstances con-
sidered by the courts in reaching their decisions make it nearly impossible,
except in the most extreme cases, to predict whether or not [the] vendor
will be successful when he claims the forfeiture. 8 2
Parallel Between the
Mortgage and Land Contract
There is unanimous agreement among legal authorities that the yen-
dee's position under the standard land contract must be improved and
that he must receive specific protection from the oppressive enforcement
of a forfeiture clause.' Most, if not all, of these legal commentators are
in accord in their belief that the necessary reform can be accomplished
by paralleling the rights of the vendee in default to those of the mortga-
gor in default. The frequently drawn comparison between these two
80. I SUGDEN, VENDORS 357 (8th Am. ed. 1873).
81. See Rudolph, The Installment Land Contract as a Junior Security, 54 MICH. L. REV.
929 (1956).
82. Howe, op. cit. supra note 75, at 449-50.
83. See Howe, op. cit. supra note 75; 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 365 (5th ed.
1941); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 791 (3d ed. 1961); Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach
of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1921); Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the
Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931); Hancock, Installment Contractsfor the Purchase of Land in Nebraska, 38 NEB. L. REV. 953 (1959); Levin, Maryland Rule
on Forfeiture Under Land Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9 MD. L. REV. 99
(1948); Pound, Progress of The Law, 1918-1919 - Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1920);
Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 YALE L.J.
754 (1935); Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 MINN. L. REv. 342
(1930); Note, 39 MINN. L. REV. 93 (1954); Note, 7 RUTGERS L. REV. 396 (1953).
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conveyancing instruments suggests but a single conclusion: Both instru-
ments are essentially intended to preserve a security interest in the prop-
erty for the benefit of the creditor - the mortgagee or vendor - who
has provided the credit financing for the transaction.84
[A] vendor who sells on credit, retaining the tide as security for the
purchase money, sustains the same relation to the vendee as far as the
question of security is concerned, as does the mortgagee to the mort-
gagor.85
The fundamental identity of purpose served by both the land contract
and mortgage instrument suggests that the relief available to the mort-
gagor in default be drawn into the land contract transaction as the
measure of relief of the vendee in default."6 A consideration of the
specific relief measures that should be made available to the defaulting
vendee is deferred to a subsequent section of this discussion.
Unwillingness of the Ohio Courts to Recognize the Parallel
The courts of Ohio through inflexible adherence to precedents es-
tablished by two old supreme court decisions87 have refused to recognize
the analogy between the mortgage and the land contract.88
84. See Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MnN. L. R¢Ev. 329, 341 (1921);
1 GLENN, MORTGAGES §§ 15-15.1 (1943); Howe, op. cit. supra note 75, at 417; Levin, Mary-
land Rule on Forfeiture Under Land Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9 MD. L.
REv. 99 (1948).
85. 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 15.1, at 79 (1943). Professor Williston has stated the same
principle by suggesting that where the vendee is in possession "the situation should be dealt
with in the same way as a mortgage situation is dealt with." 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
791, at 2227 (3d ed. 1961). He further states that "where the transaction is in its essence
a mortgage, agreements for forfeiture and provisions that time is of the essence should be
given no more weight than similar provisions in a mortgage." 5 WILLISTON at 2229.
86. The historical background of the mortgagor's absolute right to call upon these relief
mechanisms is helpful in promoting the adaptation of these same relief measures to the land
contract transaction.
Equity recognized at an early date that the mortgagee's interest in the property to which
he held conditional title was for security purposes only. Notwithstanding the fact that title
vested in the mortgagee absolutely, the courts in applying the above principle forced the
mortgagee to surrender his title to the property, once the mortgagor tendered performance
even after "law day."
87. Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 326 (1853); Rummington v. Kelley, 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 97
(1836).
88. See Norpac Realty Co. v. Schackne, 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923); Economy
Say. & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 NE.2d 125 (1957); Contractors &
Builders Supply v. Cresap, 9 Ohio App. 73, (1917). Contra, Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio
App. 210 (1922). In this case the court adopted the enlightened view advocated by current
authorities.
"Some courts of equity have held that the provision of forfeiture in land contracts, the
relation of the parties being so similar to that of mortgagor and mortgagee, will not be en-
forced by strict foreclosure, but that in land contracts, as in mortgages, if the defaulting party
fails to pay at the time set by the court, instead of cutting off the rights of the vendee under
the contract the property will be ordered sold as upon foreclosure. While it cannot be said
that the weight of authority sustains this proposition, we believe it to be equitable and sound."
19 Ohio App. at 223-24. Earlier in the opinion the court stated: "ITjhe relation of the
parties [vendor and vendee under a land contract] has many points of similarity to the relation
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In the earlier case, Rummington v. Kelley,' decided in 1836, the
vendee presented the argument equating the mortgage to the land contract
on the basis that they were fundamentally security devices." The court
refused to accept his contention and affirmed the lower court's forfeiture
decree. In so doing it stated:
There is much ingenuity in the argument of counsel in attempting to
assimilate a contract of this kind to a mortgage; but the analogy will
not hold. In the case of a mortgage, the only object of the security is
the payment of the money. In case of a land contract one great object
is a transfer of the estate.91
It is believed that the salient point in this decision is the court's summary
refusal to recognize an equitable right in the vendee to tender payment
after his default and thereby avoid a forfeiture. However, as previously
shown, contemporary Ohio courts assume a contrary position and almost
uniformly grant to the vendee a decree of specific performance, that is,
a right to redeem, after his default.
The second supreme court decision, Kirby v. Harrison,92 decided in
1853, reached a similar conclusion.
The idea that vendor and vendee stand in the mere relation of mort-
gagee and mortgagor, so that, in equity, the same time will be given
to the vendee to perform, that is given to a mortgagor to redeem, is
contrary to reason and the whole current of modern authorities.93  (Em-
phasis added.)
The most troublesome feature of this decision is that a court as recently
as 1957 mechanically reiterated this quotation, including the reference
in it to the "attitude of modern authorities," and reversed a lower court
which had ordered the property sold through judicial proceedings.' In
essence the court refused to recognize an equitable mortgage in the vendee
through which he could compel a judicial sale of the property and a
existing between a mortgagor and a mortgagee of real property. It seems to be quite well
settled that where provisions similar to the one in this contract [time of the essence clause and
forfeiture provision] have been inserted in mortgages of real estate, courts of equity have re-
fused to enforce them by strict foreclosure ...." 19 Ohio App. at 223.
89. 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 97 (1836).
90. The court paraphrased the vendee's argument as follows: "He stated that one of the
modes of conveying in the northern part of the state was by land contract. That this mode
was adopted as being more convenient than the circuitous mode of conveying by deed, and
then taking back a mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase money. In either case,
the object was the same, to secure to the vendor the price for his land; and he contended that
the same rule of decision should be adopted. As in the case of a mortgage, the mortgagor,
remaining in possession, would be allowed after any length of time to redeem; so the vendee,
holding under contract, should be allowed to compel a title upon the payment of the purchase
money, although that payment had not been made within the time prescribed." Id. at 98.
91. Id. at 104.
92. 2 Ohio St. 326 (1853).
93. Id. at 333.
94. Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (1957).
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recovery of the proceeds, if any, which were in excess of the vendor's
claim. 5 It is very obvious that this recent court's conclusion, though
perhaps in accord with the "whole current of modern authorities" (as
they existed in 1853), strongly contradicts the enlightened position uni-
versally advocated by contemporary authorities who have spoken on
the subject.8  Though the coures ultimate conclusion in the case may
have been factually justified, its legal reasoning, with all due respect to
it, was fallacious.
The above decisions represent the present position of the Ohio law.
However, the Ohio courts have, without expressly recognizing the fact,
made substantial invasions upon the out-dated doctrines announced in
and followed by the above courts. It is dear that contemporary courts in
relying upon theories of waiver, estoppel, actions for money had and
received, and decrees of specific performance to give the vendee in de-
fault relief are indirectly recognizing the similarity between the mortga-
gor in default and the vendee in default under the land contract. The
time is ripe and the need apparent for the law-making bodies of the state
to erase the out-dated, tenuous distinctions which were drawn between the
mortgage and the land contract.
The Need for Legislative Action
The apparent need for reform existing in the area of land contracts
can be accomplished by improved provisions in the land contract instru-
ment, judicial reform, or by legislative action.
By inserting appropriate provisions into the agreement the vendee
can minimize the inequality of the present standard land contract."
However, the vendor's dominant negotiating position in most land con-
tract transactions prevents accomplishment of the necessary reform by
reliance upon piecemeal modification of the terms of the standard land
contract
The courts can assume a commanding role in bringing about the
necessary reforms. When the equities of a case so demand, the courts
95. See King, Survey of Ohio Law - Equity, 10 WEST. Ras. L. R v. 402 (1959).
96. See authorities cited note 83 supra.
97. Examples of how the vendee's position can be improved through contractual provisions
are: (1) The agreement could provide for a grace period after a default, during which the
vendee could tender past payments due without suffering a forfeiture. (2) The contract could
provide for the restitution of the excess values represented by the vendees partial performance.
(3) The risk of forfeiture could be substantially reduced by providing that the vendor deliver
a deed to the vendee and refinance the debt by taking back a purchase money mortgage after
a specified percentage of the purchase price has been paid. This latter suggestion is a manda-
tory provision in every Maryland land contract. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 112 (7) (1957).
(4) Further protection for the vendee could be achieved by requiring, as is the practice in
some states, that the deed to the property be placed in escrow as of the date of the land con-
tract's execution. See Hancock, Installment Contracts for the Purchase of Land in Nebraska,
38 NEB. L REv. 953 (1959).
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should unhesitatingly grant to the vendee the right to redeem the property
after his default or if he is unable to do so, order a foreclosure by
judicial sale.9 s
Though Ohio courts have displayed a propensity toward granting
equitable relief to the vendee, the trend is uncertain and has developed
on a sporadic basis. Because of the oscillating path being developed by
the judiciary, it is clear that if the necessary reform is to be achieved,
the task must be accomplished by the legislature.
[T]he real need is for carefully drafted statutes, the effect of which the
courts will be unable to evade, and which will compel them to deal
with installment contracts for the sale of land on the same equitable
principles which they apply without hesitation in the case of trans-
actions essentially similar in economic substance but set up in the
form of a conveyance on credit with a mortgage back as security.°9
The dominant purpose which legislation should serve is to supply
the vendee in default with equitable relief measures.' 0 However, a
warning must be sounded at this point. The draftsmen of such legisla-
tion must be careful to avoid the temptation of becoming unduly pre-
occupied with devising relief measures for the vendee with a resulting
imposition of unwarranted hardship upon those vendors who have ne-
gotiated the land contract at arm's length with the vendee.'
The fundamental concepts which should be incorporated into legis-
lation to provide the vendee with the needed protection are:
(1) The vendee should be allowed a reasonable time during which
to remedy his default by tendering the balance due on the
purchase price so as to preserve his economic interests in the
property.1
0 2
(2) Upon the vendee's failure to redeem within the specified period
98. This enlightened attitude has been displayed by the Kansas Supreme Court in a recent
holding. In this case the vendee defaulted on the payments due on his land contract. The
agreement contained a time of the essence clause, a forfeiture clause, and a liquidated damages
clause. However, rather than declare a forfeiture, the court treated the land contract as an
equitable mortgage and prescribed a period during which the vendee could redeem. Nelson
v. Robinson, 184 Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959).
99. Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 YALE
L.J. 754, 779 (1935).
100. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to set forth the specific statutory posture in which
the legislation must be cast if the needed reforms are to be accomplished. Consideration of
this important aspect of the problem has been given thorough treatment in authoritative
writings and they should be consulted when confronted with that problem. Instead, the pres-
ent discussion focuses on a consideration of the substantive features which should be incor-
porated into the legislation. See generally Howe, Forfeitures In Land Contracts, in RECENT
TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1953-54, at 415, 453-537 (1954); Levin, Maryland Rule on
Forfeiture Under Land Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9 MD. L. REV. 99
(1948).
101. See Rudolph, The Installment Land Contract as a Junior Security, 54 MIcE. L. REV.
929 (1956).
102. 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 15.1 (1943).
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the court should foreclose this right and order a judicial sale
of the property."0 3
(3) If the proceeds of the sale exceed the vendor's claim, they
should be distributed to the vendee.'0 4
The analogy to the mortagor in default upon the mortgage is obvious.
And as in the mortgage transaction, the above remedies should be made
available to the vendee in default notwithstanding the presence of the
forfeiture provisions in the land contract."' 5
Statutes in a growing number of jurisdictions reflect the adaptation
of these foregoing fundamental relief measures."0 6 A number of them
provide that a vendor who seeks to enforce a forfeiture must follow a
statutory procedure. These statutes then give the vendee a grace period
in which to remedy his default.' °7 Some of these period-of-grace statutes
permit non-judicial foreclosure while others authorize only judicial fore-
closures.10'
Arizona and Maryland have enacted somewhat unusual land contract
statutes. °9 The Arizona statute gives the vendee in default the advan-
tages of an "escalator clause." The grace period during which the vendee
can redeem is extended as his equity in the property increases. The Mary-
land statute expressly restricts its jurisdiction to the sale of residential
property to non-corporate purchasers and is applicable only to those
transactions in which the sale price of the property does not exceed
103. Id. at 84-86; Rudolph, The Installment Land Contract as a Junior Security, 54 MICH.
L. REV. 929 (1956).
104. ibid.
105. '"he contract may provide that way, but so did the mortgage have a defeasance clause,
which, on its face, precluded redemption at a later day, and yet we have seen what happened
to that." 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 15.1, at 86 (1943).
The methods by which equity was able to dissolve the express language of the mortgage
instrument and the mortgagee's apparent legal interest were to grant to the mortgagor an equity
of redemption after his default. If the mortgagee could not tender payment within the re-
demption period, his rights would be forever foreclosed (strict foreclosure). However, the
modern practice is for the court to order a judicial sale of the property. The proceeds are first
distributed to satisfy the mortgagee's claim and the surplus, if any, is paid to the mortgagor.
See Note, Equitable Relief Against Forfeitures in Land Sales, 32 YALE I.J. 65 (1922); Howe,
Forfeitures in Land Contracts, in CuRRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGiSLATIoN 1953-1954, at
417-26 (1954).
106. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741, 742 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. 5
656.1-.6 (1946); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2941-47 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §
110-16 (1957, Supp. 1961). See statutes cited in Levin, Maryland Rule on Forfeiture Un-
der Land Installment Contracts - A Suggested Reform, 9 AM. L REv. 99 (1948); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27.1986-.2010 (1935, Supp. 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (Supp.
1961); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01---06 (1960); S.D. CODE §§ 37.3101-03 (1939).
107. The length of the grace period allowed the vendee varies from ten days to one year.
See statutes cited note 106 supra.
108. See IowA CODE ANN. §5 656.1-.6 (1946); MIcr-. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.1986-.2010
(1935, Supp. 1959); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01--06 (1960); S.D. CODE §§ 37.3101-03
(1939).
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741, 742 (1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 110-16
(1957, Supp. 1960).
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